所有权性质、经理人股权激励与盈余管理——来自深、沪证劵市场的经验数据  

Ownership Nature,Managers' Equity Incentives and Earnings Management:Data from Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Market

作　　者：章卫东[1] 袁聪[1] 张江凯[1] 高雪菲 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013 [2]招商银行南昌分行,江西南昌330008

出　　处：《财贸研究》2014年第4期145-151,共7页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"地方国有上市公司定向增发资产注入动机及经济后果研究"(71262004)

摘　　要：运用代理理论分析中国国有控股上市公司经理人在股票期权激励授权前进行盈余管理的动机和方法,并采用深、沪证劵市场2008—2012年153家实施股票期权激励的非金融类上市公司以及同等数量的未实施股票期权激励的对照样本进行实证检验。结果表明,上市公司在股票期权授权前进行了负的盈余管理,并且,国有控股上市公司在股票期权授权前进行负的盈余管理程度要高于民营控股上市公司。Based on the principal - agent theory, this paper analyzes motives of earnings management and methods before China＇s state-owned listed company managers are authorized in stock options incentive, and examines a sample of 153 non-financial listed companies that have implemented stock option during 2008 -2012 years in China＇s securities market. This paper finds out that Chinese listed companies in stock options implemented negative earnings management, and China＇s state-owned listed company in stock options implemented negative earnings management level is higher than private listed companies.

关 键 词：股权激励 盈余管理 所有权性质 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]