基于虚拟第三方的供应链激励协调与效率研究  

A Study of Incentives Coordination and Efficiency in Supply Chain Based on Virtual-third Party

作　　者：黄梅萍[1,2] 汪贤裕[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学土木工程学院,福建福州350108 [2]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《经济经纬》2014年第6期84-89,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(13YJC630053);福州大学科研启动项目(XRC-1267)

摘　　要：笔者运用委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,对供应链激励协调与效率进行分析。研究发现:尽管事前决策存在风险,但供销双方从自身利益最大化出发,都有动力寻求最优的α和β组合,使得供应链实现协调,即使无法达成协调的目标,为了在事后得到更多的利益,不仅供应商有积极性降低生产成本,而且销售商也愿意与生产成本低的供应商构建合作伙伴关系。To solve the problem of no coordination body and inefficiency caused by bilateral asymmetric information in supply chain, the virtual-third party is introduced to be the principal without its own profit based on the principal-agent theory. And then the incentives coordination model is established to analyze the efficiency of the supply chain. The results show that, although there is the pre-decision risk, both of the supplier and retailer would like to seek the best combination of revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing proportion, to maximize their own interests and then realize the supply chain coordination. Even if sometimes it is unable to reach coordination, not only the supplier is motivated to reduce production costs, but also the seller is willing to cooperate with the supplier with low production costs , to get more ex post benefits.

关 键 词：供应链 激励协调 虚拟第三方 委托代理 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]