装备制造业R&D联盟稳定性动态博弈研究  

Research on the equipment manufacturing industry R&D of the alliance stability dynamic game

作　　者：郝红军[1] 蒋绪亮 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《科技与管理》2014年第6期61-66,共6页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：黑龙江省研究生创新科研项目(YJSCX2012-081HLJ)

摘　　要：技术创新关系到装备制造业的生存和发展,R&D联盟是装备制造业进行技术创新的重要组织形式,R&D联盟稳定性影响联盟技术创新进程。联盟效率和联盟公平是影响联盟稳定性的直接因素,以联盟效率和联盟利益分配2个角度为切入点,探究联盟的行为策略对联盟稳定性的影响。将联盟行为策略抽象化、定量化,构建R&D联盟博弈模型,分析联盟效率最佳状态和公平利益分配状态,计算联盟效率损失和不公平分配对联盟稳定性的影响,求解联盟成员容忍的行为策略区间。Technological innovation is related to the survival and development of equipment manufacturing industry. R＆D alliance is the important organizational form of the equipment manufacturing industry technological innovation. R＆D alliance stability influences the alliance technology innovation process. Alliance efficiency and fairness is the direct factors affecting the stability of alliance. The paper takes alliance efficiency and profit distribution as the entry point to explore the effects of the acts of alliance strategies on the stability of the alliance, quantifyies the alliance behavior strategy, constructs the game model of the R＆D alliances, analyzes the best alliance efficiency and the equitable distribution of benefits status, calculates the alliance efficiency losses and unfair distributions of the effect on the stability of the alliance, solving the behavior strategy interval of the alliance members＇ tolerance.

关 键 词：装备制造业 R&D联盟 稳定性 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]