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机构地区:[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116025
出 处:《经济管理》2015年第1期87-97,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基 金:教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"农产品流通体系建设的机制创新与政策体系研究"(12JZD025);国家自然科学基金项目"企业及其边界人员角色导向对营销渠道治理机制及其结果的影响:基于角色理论的多层面研究"(71202038);教育部新世纪优秀人才项目"组织间关系与跨组织人际关系交互作用对中国企业渠道治理机制的影响:本土文化视角"(NCET-13-0708)
摘 要:以往研究多是从经济学角度关注契约型农产品交易关系稳定性问题,却忽视了交易关系中的许多行为问题。近年来,学者们将营销渠道行为以及渠道治理理论应用到契约型农产品渠道领域,探讨企业与农户之间的互动行为及其对交易绩效的影响。但是,这一领域仍然存在一些问题有待进一步研究。本文以渠道治理理论为基础,检验了契约治理(契约明确性与可执行性)和收购商的管理控制活动(结果控制与过程控制)对农户绩效的影响作用。通过对来自参与订单农业的农户的217份调查数据进行分析发现,契约明确性和可执行性能够显著提升农户绩效;结果控制和过程控制也能够显著提升农户绩效。但是,结果控制和过程控制会削弱契约明确性和可执行性对农户绩效的提升作用。本文最后对上述发现的理论意义进行了讨论,并给出了相应的管理与政策建议,指出了未来的研究方向。Previous studies on the stability of contractual channel of agricultural products are mainly from eco- nomic perspective, which ignores behaviors of parties in transaction relationships. Recently, some studies apply theories on marketing channel behavior and governance to contractual channel of agricultural products, and investigate the interaction behaviors between famers and buyers and their effects on transaction performance. Despite increasing interest in this topic, several aspects remain unanswered. First, although some studies emphasize the important role of contract governance, it is not clear whether contract governance could directly promote farmers' performance. Moreover, explicit contract does not mean wholly enforcement. Thus, this study also investigates the effect of farmer' s perceived enforceability on their performance. Based on contract literatures, contracts specificity refers to formal agreements that specify and detail the obligations of each party, how each party to perform, and how to deal with unexpected events. And perceived enforceability of contract means that one party perceives that contract can (cannot) protect their own interests. Second, for the problems in contractual channel of agricultural products, such as the imbalance of power structure, contract incompleteness and enforcement difficulties, buyer firms need managerial control to support transaction activities. Additionally, managerial control practices may support or dampen the efficiency of contract governance mechanisms. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of management control on farmers' performance, as well as its moderating role between contract governance and farmers' perform- ance. Based on channel control literatures, this study focus on two key types of control : outcome control, which focus on visible consequences of a partner' s actions, and process control, which offers suggestions or guidance to influence a partner' s marketing activities. Based on theories on channel governance and
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