中国式分权竞争与环境治理  

Chinese Style Decentralization and Environmental Governance

作　　者：李正升[1] 

机构地区：[1]云南师范大学云南华文学院,云南昆明650000

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2014年第6期4-12,共9页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12XJC790008);云南省应用基础研究面上项目(2011FZ085)

摘　　要：基于财政分权和政治集权的中国式分权体制,建立一个中央与地方及地方政府间的博弈竞争模型,考察转型期我国地方政府的环境治理行为。结果表明:中央政府强调经济增长和地方政府重视财政激励,令地方政府过分偏向基础设施投入而忽视环境的保护和治理;在资本流动的情况下,禀赋条件好的地区其地方政府更"重基础设施、轻环境治理",禀赋条件差的地区其地方政府反而会相对减少基础设施投入,而更重环境公共物品投入;地方政府间的环境公共物品提供存在策略性互补行为时,溢出效应的上升将使两个地方政府的环境公共物品供给增加,地方政府间的环境公共物品提供存在策略性替代行为时,溢出效应的上升将使两个地方政府间的环境公共物品供给出现"骑跷跷板"特征。This paper makes an analysis of the behavior of environmental governance during the period of transition based on the Chinese style decentralization structure of fiscal decentralization and political concentration from the view of a game model of central-local and inter-government＇s competition. The result shows that the local government stresses on infrastructure investment but ignores environmental protection and governance, because the central government pays more attention to rapid economic growth and the local govern- ment attaches more importance to fiscal incentives. In the condition of capital mobility, it finds that, in the areas having high resource endowment, the government pays more attention to infrastructure than environmental protection and governance. But the contrary result will happen in the areas having low resource endowment. When the supply of environmental public goods is complementary in the inter-governments, local governments will increase the supply of environmental public goods because of rising spillover effects, howev- er, when the supply of environmental public goods is substitutive in the inter-governments, seesaw phenomenon will take place in the two local governments at the same time as a result of rising spillover effects.

关 键 词：分权竞争 环境治理 地方政府 财政激励 政治激励 晋升锦标赛 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F812[经济管理—财政学]