博弈分析框架下的供应链应收账款融资研究  

Research of Accounts Receivable Financing in Supply Chain under Game Analysis Framework

作　　者：黄海洋[1] 叶春明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《物流科技》2014年第12期8-12,共5页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目;项目编号:71271138;上海市一流学科建设项目;项目编号:S1201YLXK;沪江基金项目;项目编号:A14006;上海理工大学人文社科攀登计划项目;项目编号:14XPB01

摘　　要：如何解决中小企业融资难问题,一直困扰着理论界和实务界。供应链金融概念的提出和发展,为中小企业融资难问题提供了解决办法。作为供应链金融的融资工具之一,应收账款融资由于在操作上的快捷和简便,受到众多中小企业和银行的青睐。文章从博弈论的角度,分析了核心企业、中小企业供应商、银行三方在应收账款融资过程中的决策。通过分析可以得出,核心企业从自身的经营稳定性和利益出发,会选择为中小企业应收账款融资提供担保。同时,银行为了扩展自身业务,提高资产收益,会接受中小企业提出的应收账款融资请求。核心企业、中小企业、银行之间的博弈达到帕累托最优。How to solve the financing difficulties of SMEs has plagued theorists and practitioners for a long time. Proposed and developed the concept of supply chain finance offering a solution for SMEs financing issues. As one of the financing instruments of supply chain finance, accounts receivable financing due to the easy operation, it is very popular with numerous SMEs and banks. From the perspective of game theory to analyze the core enterprise, SME suppliers, banks tripartite＇s decision-making in accounts receivable financing process. Through the analysis can conclude that core enterprises will choose to provide guarantees for SME accounts receivable financing from their own operating stability and interests.Meanwhile, the banks in order to expand their business and improve return on assets, will accept accounts receivable financing requests proposed by SMEs. Game between core enterprises, SMEs, banks reach Pareto optimality.

关 键 词：供应链金融 应收账款融资 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F275.6[经济管理—企业管理]