基金持股、高管集权与现金分红研究  

Research on Fund Shareholding, High Concentration of Executive Power and Cash Dividends

作　　者：齐鲁光[1] 耿贵彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学商学院,山东淄博255049

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2015年第3期94-97,共4页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：山东省高校人文社科项目<制度环境;管理层权利与文化企业高管薪酬的激励效应研究>(J14WG24)

摘　　要：上市公司不分红或少分红一直是我国资本市场治理的热点和难点问题。文章以沪深A股上市公司2008-2012年数据为样本进行实证研究，结果发现高管集权与上市公司不分红或少分红显著相关，而基金持股可以促进上市公司的现金分红，抑刺高管集权产生的代理问题。It has been a hot and difficult governance problem of Chinese capital market that listed companies do not pay or pay less cash dividends. This paper chooses A-share listed companies as samples from 2008 to 2012 and tests that there is high significant correlation between no paying or paying less cash dividends and high concentration of executive power, Fund shareholding can promote increasing cash dividends, and weaken agency problem from internal control defects. It has a certain reference value to standardize deficiencies of listed companies＇ dividend policy and improve the level of corporate governance.

关 键 词：高管集权 代理理论 股利政策 基金持股 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]