努力水平影响损耗的低值易逝品TPL协调合同  

Third party logistics coordinating contracts for low value perishable products with loss dependent on logistics effort levels

作　　者：吴庆[1] 但斌[2] 钱宇[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2014年第12期15-26,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70902019;71272086;71102055)

摘　　要：对于一类低值易逝品,损耗与物流服务价格是影响这类产品订购与销售价格决策的重要影响因素.主要研究了第3方物流服务提供商的努力水平会影响到客户企业产品的数量和质量损耗情形下的物流外包渠道优化与协调问题.通过建立动态博弈模型,分析了传统交易价格合同下双方的决策行为,结果表明双方的决策冲突会导致产品订购量和销售价格的扭曲,但不存在努力水平的扭曲,进而会导致次优渠道绩效.为了解决这一问题,设计了收入共享与努力成本共担合同,并论证了在一定条件下这一合同可以实现渠道协调、双方共赢.最后,相应的算例表明努力水平影响产品质量和数量损耗的程度会对双方、集中式系统的决策行为和绩效产生重要的影响.For a low value perishable product,product losses in the logistics process and logistics service prices have important influences on the decisions of both order and selling price. This paper focuses on the optimization and coordination problems in an outsourcing logistics channel where the quantity and quality losses of a client enterprise＇s product depend on the logistics effort levels selected by a Third Party Logistics Service Provider（ TPLSP）. A dynamic game model is established to analyze the decision conflicts under a traditional unit pricing contract where the TPLSP sets logistics effort levels and service prices,and the client enterprise chooses the product order quantity and selling prices. Results show that the decision conflicts lead to distortions of both order quantity and selling price,and further result in suboptimal channel performance,but do not cause effort level distortions. To resolve the problem,a revenue and effort cost sharing contract is designed and the contract terms to achieve perfect channel coordination and a win-win outcome are identified. Finally,computational studies show the effects of effort levels on the product＇s quantity and quality losses have important influences on the decisions of each firm and the integrated system,and the channel performances.

关 键 词：第3方物流 合同设计 博弈 协调 易逝品 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]