R&D外包中攻防变换——效用视角  

Offense and Defense Conversion of R&D Outsourcing Based on Utility

作　　者：孔令夷[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,西安710061

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2015年第1期108-114,共7页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102149;71173172);国家社会科学基金项目(11CJY064);工信部通信软科学项目(2014R-37);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790084);陕西省教育厅人文社会科学专项(12JK0056)

摘　　要：我国企业越来越热衷于研发外包以便更快获取先进技术及新产品,因此研究各种要素及外包条件对R&D外包博弈中攻防结构及接发包商效用的影响具有较高价值。在两方R&D外包模式下,研究R&D外包博弈均衡的双方效用值;设计效用流转及触发威慑规则,对几种研发外包情境中的攻防格局及效用分配做了比较研究。发现,纳什外包博弈均衡解是功利思想和平等思想原则的整合;对于发包商而言,效用流转及威慑触发条件下的新均衡解都优于一般均衡解,而且效用流转相对于威慑触发对发包商的攻防位势更有利,使其均衡效用改进幅度更大。Chinese enterprises were more and more keen on R＆D outsourcing in order to acquire advanced tech-nology and new products faster. So, various elements and outsourcing conditions research on the influence of of-fensive and defensive structures of R＆D outsourcing game and utility of outsourcer and contractor had great va-lue. Under R＆D outsourcing pattern of two parties, the paper studied utility of R＆D outsourcing game equilibrium, designed utility flow and threat trigger rule, and made comparative study on offensive and defensive patterns and utility distribution in several R＆D outsourcing situations. It was found that Nash outsourcing game equilibrium so-lution was an integration of utilitarian thoughts and equality principle. For outsourcer, new equilibrium solution was better than the general one under the condition of utility flow and threat trigger. And outsourcer would get better terms of offense and defense potential, and gain a greater improvement amplitude in utility, relying on utili-ty flow rather than threat trigger.

关 键 词：效用 研发外包 流转 触发点 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]