基于三方博弈模型的网络交易平台收费机制研究  

The Study of Charging Mechanism of Internet Trading Platform Based on Tripartite Game Model

作　　者：张卫东[1] 耿笑 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2014年第12期135-141,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(11YJA790210)

摘　　要：网络交易平台因向消费者提供商品信息而发展壮大,但学界对其收费机制仍缺乏系统认识。本文通过建立三方博弈模型,分析了网络交易平台、厂商与消费者的市场作用与相互关系。结果表明,因为消费者处理信息的能力有限,所以由网络交易平台为其加工信息并获得盈利。其中,将优先展示席位拍卖给厂商是实现盈利的重要形式,因为展示席位的收费与消费者自行获得商品信息的成本有关,所以网购市场上服装类商品逐渐代替图书类商品。另外,随着消费者愿意网购更昂贵的商品,交易平台与厂商的合作趋于稳定,获得信息成本较高的商品被挤出市场,因此消费者网购中品牌商品逐渐代替个人出售的非品牌商品。This research topic came from the contradiction between the rapid growth of online shopping transactions and the scant understanding on the charging mechanism of the Internet trading platform. The question need to be answered is that where does the Internet trading platform gain profit from, and how can they improve the profit. By establishing a tripartite game model, the relationship between the Internet trading platform, manufacturers and consumers is analyzed, how the decision from a part affect the deci- sion from another part is explained. The results show that the Internet trading platform gains from the auction of advertising seats and the charge of the seat are positive correlated with the cost on dealing with information of good by consumers. By using simulated data, the model provides explains for the following facts： First, clothing merchandise gradually replace book commodities in online shopping market. Moreo- ver, as consumers are willing to purchase more expensive goods on the Internet, the cooperation between the trading platform and manufacturers become more stable, goods with higher information costs were squeezed out of the market. Therefore, the consumer purchases brand goods instead of non-branded goods gradually online. This study could help government, consumer and company to make their decision. The research of Internet trading platform can also profoundly promote Information economics.

关 键 词：网络交易平台 三方博弈 收费机制 广告席位 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]