考虑信息泄露的供应链成员行为  

A Behavioral Research of the Supply Chain Members Considering Information Leakage

作　　者：邱小平[1,2,3] 李英波[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031 [2]综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都610031 [3]综合运输四川省重点实验室,四川成都610031

出　　处：《工业工程》2014年第6期95-102,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61175055);国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL013);高等学校博士学位点专项科研基金-新教师课题资助项目(20090184120018);四川省科技支持计划资助项目(2013GZX0167)

摘　　要：为了研究供应链中纵向成员信息共享及横向成员之间的需求信息泄露行为发生机理,针对服从伯川德竞争的替代产品,建立了由一个批发商与两个竞争型零售商(在位零售商和跟随零售商)组成的基本模型,探讨了批发商泄露与不泄露在位零售商产品定价信息时两个零售商的产品差别定价策略,分析了批发商的泄露行为选择机理。研究表明:当批发商泄露在位零售商定价信息时,零售商一定进行分离均衡定价;当在位零售商定价高于分离均衡高价格时,跟随零售商判断市场为高需求状态,反之为低;当在位零售商的产品定价位于最小泄露区间时,批发商一定泄露在位零售商的定价信息。In order to study information sharing between longitudinal members and horizontal members＇ demand information leakage mechanism in a supply chain, a basic model consisting of one wholesaler and two competing retailers （incumbent and entrant） is established. The selling products are alternative and subject to Bertrand competition. The differential pricing strategies of the two retailers are discussed under the conditions of information confidentiality and information leakage. The supplier＇s choice mechanism is analyzed. The results are as follows： Once the leakage occurs, the retailers will choose the separating equilibrium price. The entrant can judge that the market is high when the incumbent＇s price is higher than separating equilibrium price, and otherwise low in market demand. When the product pricing of the incumbent is at the minimum interval, the wholesaler will disclose the incumbent＇s pricing information.

关 键 词：信息甄别 伯川德竞争 差别定价 信息泄露 供应链 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]