委托—代理视角的保障性住房政策地方执行阻滞分析  

An Analysis on Lack of Affordable Housing Policy Implementation of the Local Government from the View of Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：谭禹[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东技术师范学院经济与贸易学院商务系,广东广州510000

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2014年第12期31-37,共7页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：广东省财政科研项目--支持广东省保障性住房建设的财政政策研究

摘　　要：地方政府住房保障政策执行力不足已严重阻碍了保障性住房的健康发展。以委托—代理理论为视角分析了住房保障政策地方执行阻滞的深层次原因,在于中央与地方利益目标函数不一致、财政集权体制不健全、信息沟通机制不健全、监督与制约机制不健全等。研究表明,提高地方政府住房政策执行力不能简单地依靠加大对地方政府的监督惩处力度,而是要加强中央与地方的利益整合,完善政府间信息沟通机制,构建完善的激励与监督机制等。Its the local government＇ s lack of policy execution that has seriously hindered the healthy development of affordable housing.This paper uses the principal-agent theory to analysis the deep-seated reasons about the lack of policy execution.There are four main reasons.Firstly,there are difference in goal or interests between the central and local.Secondly,the fiscal centralization system is not perfect.Thirdly,the information communication mechanism is not perfect.Finally the supervision and restriction mechanism is not perfect.Research shows that improving the executive ability of the policy can not simply rely on the increase of local government supervision and punishment.But to strengthen the integration of the interests of the central and local,to improve information communication mechanism among governments,to perfect mechanism of incentive and supervision mechanism.

关 键 词：委托—代理 保障性住房 地方政府 政策执行 

分 类 号：F293.31[经济管理—国民经济]