基于旅客选择影响的高速铁路及航空客票定价博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Ticket Pricing of High-speed Railway and Civil Aviation based on Influence of Passenger Selection

作　　者：张睿[1] 栾维新[1] 赵冰茹[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连海事大学交通运输管理学院,辽宁大连116026

出　　处：《铁道运输与经济》2015年第1期5-9,34,共6页Railway Transport and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(41101113)

摘　　要：以一个双层规划模型描述以高速铁路和航空为主导的高速客运市场。在上层问题中,以客票价格作为高速铁路和航空的决策变量,建立运营商之间的广义纳什均衡博弈模型,下层问题保证用户广义出行费用最小。将上、下层之间的博弈过程看作Stackelberg博弈,并设计基于灵敏度分析的启发式算法对其进行求解。在实例分析中,对北京—南京段高速铁路与民航的博弈定价进行分析,为上层管理者制定客票价格提供依据。By using a double-layers planning model, this paper describes the high-speed passenger market which taking high-speed railways and civil aviation as the dominant. On the upper layer, taking the ticket price as a decision variable of high-speed railway and civil aviation, the generalized Nash Balanced Game Model among operators was established, and the lower layer could ensure the generalized minimum traveling expenses of users. The game process between upper layer and lower layer was regarded as Stackelberg game and was solved by designed heuristic algorithm based on sensitivity analysis. During the example analysis, this paper analyzes the game pricing of high-speed railway and civil aviation on Beijing-Nanjing section, which provide reference for upper layer managers setting ticket price.

关 键 词：高速铁路 航空 客票定价 博弈论 启发式算法 

分 类 号：F532.5[经济管理—产业经济]