集团化企业决策权配置研究——基于母子公司治理距离的视角  

Allocation of Decision Rights in Business Groups——From the Perspective of Parent-subsidiary Governance Distance

作　　者：杨阳[1] 王凤彬[2] 孙春艳[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2015年第1期108-120,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"中国大型企业集团管控模式的多样性与演进路径研究"(批准号71372158);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"两栖理论视角下中国企业FDI均衡与公司价值关系研究"(批准号14YJC630165)

摘　　要：继承有关事业部制组织中"战略权集中、经营权分散"的权限分类研究逻辑,本文将决策权解构为战略、投资、人事、财务、预算和经营6个子类权限,并从管理组织结构与治理结构交互作用角度,以中国104家中央企业集团为样本,对不同子类决策权在集团母公司与其直属单位之间的配置进行多元方差分析。研究发现:①大型国有企业集团整体上呈现战略权和投资权集中程度高、经营权分散程度高、其他权限居中的"大权独揽、小权分散"的差异化配置特征:②各子类决策权的分权程度在职能型、事业部型和控股型管控架构之间并不存在显著差异,但在不同母子公司治理距离间的差异,尤其是预算权和财务权配置上的差异具有显著性;③母子公司治理距离在集团管控架构与财务、投资等子类决策权配置关系中发挥显著的调节作用。企业集团必须通过加强公司治理建设,促进决策权配置与管控架构的融合。Extending the dichotomous logic of ＂centralization of strategic rights and decentralization of operational fights＂ in the M-form structuring, we decompose the decision rights into six subclasses, i.e., strategy, investment, human resource, finance, budget and operation; And then we run a multivariate analysis of variance on the allocation of multi-class decision fights between the parent company and its directly affiliated units in the 104 central enterprise groups. We find out： （1）In these large state-owned enterprise groups, the allocation pattern of decision rights take shapes, in which important sub-class fights are centralized while less important sub-class rights decentralized. （2）There are no significant differences in the allocation of the sub-class rights between three organizational structures, i.e., functional, multi-business and holding structures; However, there are significant differences in the allocation of the sub-class rights between different parent-subsidiary governance distances, especially in the allocation of budget and financial fights. （3）The parent-subsidiary governance distance exerts a significant moderate effect on the relationship between organizational structure and the allocation of sub-class rights, especially in the allocation of financial and investment fights. These results suggest that large enterprise groups should improve their abilities of corporate governance to facilitate the alignment between the allocation of decision rights and organizational structure.

关 键 词：中央企业集团 决策权配置 管控架构 母子公司治理距离 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]