独董与其他高管的公司治理作用有差异吗?——基于政治关联与审计契约视角的检验  

Do Independent Directors and Other Executives Have the Same Role of Corporate Governance? Based on Political Connections and the Audit Contract

作　　者：刘颖斐[1] 陈亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2015年第1期36-45,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委资助项目(70702018;71272227)

摘　　要：以2007—2011年A股非金融保险业上市公司为样本,从政治关联与审计契约角度揭示独立董事与其他高管在公司治理中的差异。研究发现:在审计师选择方面,独立董事存在政治关联的企业倾向于选择高质量的审计服务,其他高管存在政治关联的企业倾向于选择低质量的审计服务。结合对审计费用考察发现,其他高管存在政治关联的企业选择较低质量审计服务的同时却支付相对较高的审计费用,但又并没有支付显著高于独立董事存在政治关联的企业选择高质量审计服务时支付的审计费用。By using 2007-2011 A-share listed non-financial insurance industry as a sample, we divide the political connec- tions into different types of independent directors political connections and other executives political connections according to the types of executives and find the different role of corporate governance between the independent directors and the other exec- utives from the perspective of political connections and the audit contract. We show that companies with independent director political connections tend to choose high-quality audit services, and companies with other executive political connections tend to choose low-quality audit services. We also show that companies with other executive political connections tend to choose a lower-quality audit services but pay relatively higher audit fees, and do not pay significantly higher than the companies with in- dependent director political connections. Therefore, the study indicates that independent directors tend to use “supporting hand” of political connections to play a role in corporate governance while other executives tend to use the “grabbing hand”.

关 键 词：政治关联 公司治理 独立董事制度 审计契约 审计意见 审计费用 审计师选择 审计质量 企业高管 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]