政治联系方式、产权性质与高管薪酬契约——基于政府补贴和政治身份的视角  

Way of Political Connections,Property Rights and TMT's Compensation Contracts: Based on the Angle of Government Subsidies and Political Identity

作　　者：吴成颂[1] 唐伟正 黄送钦[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2015年第1期46-56,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71302113);国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD011)

摘　　要：从政府角度考察政治联系对于高管薪酬契约的影响可能会得到与企业角度截然不同的结论。鉴于此,使用2008—2011年沪市A股制造业的数据,分别选取政府补贴和高管政治身份作为衡量政府与企业角度政治联系的代理变量,首次比较不同政治联系方式对高管薪酬契约的影响差异。实证研究表明,虽然企业角度与政府角度衡量的政治联系均显著地提高了高管薪酬,但是从企业角度衡量的政治联系会削弱高管薪绩敏感性,而从政府角度衡量的政治联系却能显著提升高管薪绩敏感性。在进一步的产权性质对比研究后发现,政府角度政治联系对高管薪绩敏感性的提升效应在民营企业中表现得更为明显,而企业角度政治联系对高管薪绩敏感性的削弱效应则在国有企业中表现得更强。The impact of political connections on TMT＇s compensation contracts may be completely different from the angle of government or enterprise. In view of this, by using the data of China＇s A-share Listed companies in manufacturing from 2008 to 2011, we selected government subsidies and political identity as proxy variables of political connections of government and en- terprise angle, this is the first research to compare the different impacts of different political connections on TMT＇s compensa- tion contracts. Empirical studies show that： although both government and enterprise angle of political connections can signifi- cantly improve TMT＇s compensation, political connections based on enterprise would undermine TMT＇S pay performance sensi- tivity, and political connections based on government are able to improve TMT＇s pay performance sensitivity. After a further comparative study based on property rights, we find that the enhancing effect of political connections from enterprise angle on TMT＇s pay performance sensitivity are more obvious in private enterprises, and the weakening effect of political connections from government angle on TMT＇s pay performance sensitivity are more obvious in SOEs.

关 键 词：政治联系方式 政府补贴 政治身份 高管薪绩敏感性 产权性质 制造业 高管薪酬契约 薪酬粘性 

分 类 号：F203.9[经济管理—国民经济]