高管激励与环境信息披露质量关系研究——基于政府和市场调节作用的视角  

Study on the Relationship between Executive Incentive and Quality of Environmental Information Disclosure——Based on the Moderating Effects of Government and Market

作　　者：李强[1] 冯波[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第2期93-104,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71103181);国家社会科学基金项目(14CJY079);教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJC790151);江苏省社会科学基金项目(13EYC021)

摘　　要：以中国2008～2012年沪深A股重污染行业上市公司为样本，实证研究高管激励与环境信息披露质量的相关性，并分别检验政府干预和产品市场竞争对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励与环境信息披露质量负相关，高管股权激励与环境信息披露质量正相关。进一步考虑政府和市场调节作用的分析表明，政府干预抑制了高管激励机制的运行效果，与高管激励机制形成了替代效应；产品市场竞争与高管薪酬激励在一定范围内存在替代效应，与高管股权激励存在互补效应。本文的研究为完善高管激励机制和发挥政府与市场“两只手”作用，进而提升企业环境信息披露质量提供了新的经验证据。Using the samples of A-share listed companies of heavy-polluted industries from 2008 to 2012, this paper empirically in- vestigates the impact of executive incentive on quality of environmental information disclosure, and examines the moderating effects of government intervention and product market competition. The study finds that executive compensation is negatively related to quality of environmental information disclosure, while equity incentive has positive effect. Moreover, considering the moderating effects of government intervention and product market competition, it shows that substitution effect exists between government intervention and executive incentive mechanism, and substitution effect exists between product market competition and compensation incentives within a certain range, comple- mentary effect exists between product market competition and equity incentive. It contributes to improving the executive incentive mechanism and brings government and market into full play, and provides new empirical evidence for enhancing the quality of environmental information disclosure.

关 键 词：高管激励 环境信息 信息披露 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]