家族控制、PE股权制衡与公司价值  

Family Control,PE Blockholder and Corporate Value

作　　者：苏启林[1,2] 蒲惠荧[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632 [2]暨南大学广东外贸服务研究中心,广东广州510632

出　　处：《预测》2015年第1期41-47,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20080430715);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(S2012010008601)

摘　　要：股权投资者参与公司治理是近年来公司治理研究的热点话题。本文基于股权结构内生性的视角研究私募股权投资(PE)股权制衡对上市公司家族控制问题的治理效应及其对公司价值产生的影响。理论研究表明,股权制衡结构的形成受制于家族控制程度,当上市公司家族控制问题较为严重时,会削弱PE的监督制衡作用。鉴于股权制衡结构形成的内生性,本文的实证研究采用工具变量和两阶段最小二乘法进行回归,实证结果验证了理论模型的结论,同时也揭示了PE股权制衡与家族控制的内生联动关系;此外,关于PE股权制衡与公司价值的实证分析也表明,股权制衡结构与公司价值存在内生关系,PE股权制衡有助于降低家族控制造成的损失,提高上市公司的价值水平。Private Equity investors participating in corporate governance is a hot topic in recent years. This article studies the governance effect of PE blockholder to family control problem and its impact on corporate value from the perspective of endogenous ownership structure. Theoretical studies show that the formation of equity balance structure is subject to the degree of family control. When the family control problem is serious in a company, it will weaken PE’ s supervisory function. Considering the endogeneity of equity balance structure, we use the method of instrumental variables and two-stage least square regression. Our empirical results verify the conclusions of the theoretical model, and also reveal the endogenous linkage between the PE blockholder and family control degree. In addition, empirical results of PE blockholder and corporate value show that, there is endogenous relationship between PE balancing structure and corporate value. PE blockholder can reduce the losses caused by family control, and improve corporate value.

关 键 词：家族控制 股权制衡 公司价值 内生性视角 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]