政府控制、政府层级与企业并购绩效  

Government Control,Levels of Government and the Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions of Enterprises

作　　者：胡国柳[1] 胡珺[1] 李少华[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《预测》2015年第1期54-59,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71062009);教育部新世纪人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-10-0123);海南大学中西部高校综合实力提升计划资助项目(HDZHSL201301);天津大学-海南大学协同创新基金资助项目(T-HXTCX201303);海南大学研究生创新资助项目(Yjs992696)

摘　　要：本文选取深沪A股上市公司2007-2009年成功实施并购交易的主并公司为样本，对不同政府控制背景下的企业长短期并购绩效进行了研究。结果表明：在短期内，相对于政府控制企业，非政府控制企业的并购绩效更好；相对于地方政府控制企业，中央政府控制企业的并购绩效更好，政府“掠夺”效应占主导地位。在长期内，政府控制企业的并购绩效优于非政府控制企业绩效，地方政府控制企业与中央政府控制企业的并购绩效没有显著差异，政府“支持”效应占主导地位。本文结论从政府控制角度解释了我国企业并购的“成功悖论”，同时也为有关部门更好地规范地方政府行为和监管公司治理提供了可操作的政策建议。Selecting the data of Chinese listed companies which have successfully taken merge and acquisition from 2007-2009, this paper analyzes the long term and short term M＆A performance of enterprises under different background of government control. The results show that： in the short term, the non-government-controlled enterprises show better M＆A performance comparing to the government-controlled enterprises, and the central government-controlled enterprises show better M＆A performance comparing to the local government-controlled enterprises, which indicates that the“preda-tory” effect of government is dominant in the process of M＆A. However, In the long term, the M＆A performance of government-controlled enterprises are better than non-government-controlled enterprises, and the differences of M＆A performance between local government-controlled enterprises and the central government-controlled enterprises are not significant, which uphold the “support” effect of government. The conclusion explains the “success paradox” of M＆A activities of Chinese enterprises from the perspective of government control, and provides a guideline for the related departments to regulate the behavior of local government and corporation.

关 键 词：政府控制 政府层级 事件研究 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]