考虑顾客行为和成员风险规避性的供应链收益共享契约的设计与协调  

Decision Models and Coordination for Supply Chain under Strategic Customer Behavior and CVaR Criteria

作　　者：张新鑫[1] 申成霖[2] 侯文华[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]天津工业大学管理学院,天津300387

出　　处：《预测》2015年第1期70-75,65,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年资助项目(13CGL058);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(11YJC630174)

摘　　要：本文构建了顾客策略行为下基于CVaR风险度量准则及收益共享契约的供应链决策模型。分析了集中式和分散式供应链系统中,风险规避的供应链成员企业的最优决策行为。采用群决策理论,探讨了收益共享契约的协调机制和利润的分配机制。研究表明:第一,顾客策略行为下,产品的最优零售价格可以起到平衡供应链的利润与风险的杠杆作用;第二,当零售商和制造商的风险规避度不等时,基于帕累托最优准则的收益共享契约可以使分散式供应链达到协调,但不能实现渠道利润在成员企业间的任意分配,各成员企业获得的最终利润取决于他们的相对风险规避度和在供应链中的影响力;第三,基于帕累托最优准则的收益共享契约能够平衡供应链成员企业间的利润与风险。The supply chain decision model considering strategic customer behavior is proposed based on revenue sharing contract. In a conditional value-at-risk framework, the optimal decision making behavior of centralized and decentralized supply chain are analyzed when supply chain members are both risk-averse. In addition, coordination mechanism as well as channel profit allocation between supply chain members are discussed based on group decision theory. The results are as follows. Firstly, the optimal retail price becomes endogenous and can be a good tool to balance the system’ s profit and risk to a certain extent when there are a large number of strategic customers. Secondly, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can coordinate the decentralized supply chain, but the channel profit cannot be alloca-ted arbitrarily between members in this contract when the risk-aversion of members is not equal. The final profits of the members depend not only on relative risk-aversion of members but also on their own influence powers in supply chain. Finally, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can balance the profits and the risks between supply chain members.

关 键 词：CVaR风险度量准则 顾客策略行为 收益共享契约 供应链协调 帕累托最优准则 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]