大股东控制、股权制衡与企业公益性捐赠  

Control of Large Shareholder,Power Balance with Shareholder Structure and Corporate Public Welfare Donations

作　　者：曹越[1] 姚位燕[1] 张肖飞[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082 [2]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450002

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2015年第1期132-140,共9页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目"国家经济安全体系中审计监督功能定位与实施路径研究"(11CJY013)

摘　　要：企业公益性捐赠支出受到大股东控制的影响,股权结构会对企业公益性捐赠行为产生重要影响。本文以股权分置改革后2008~2012年沪深两市财务报表附注中披露公益性捐赠支出的上市公司为研究样本,检验大股东控制、股权制衡对企业公益性捐赠水平的影响,研究发现：大股东控制显著降低了企业公益性捐赠水平,股权制衡显著提升了企业公益性捐赠水平,股权制衡显著抑制大股东控制对公益性捐赠水平的降低效应。考虑企业产权性质差异后的结果显示：大股东控制对企业公益性捐赠水平的降低效应和股权制衡对企业公益性捐赠水平的提升效应仅在民营企业中显著,并且股权制衡对大股东控制降低企业公益性捐赠水平的抑制作用在民营企业中更加显著。Corporate public welfare donations are affected by control of large shareholder;the shareholder structure has also an important effect on corporate public welfare donations.We use the data of corporate public welfare donations of Chinese listed Companies from 2008 to 2012as samples to examine the impact of large shareholder control and power balance with shareholder structure on corporate public welfare donations.The result is that control of large shareholder significantly reduces corporate public welfare donations,and power balance with shareholder structure enhances corporate public welfare donations.Power balance with shareholder structure has a significant suppression on effect of large shareholder on corporate public welfare donations.Considering the nature of property right,the effect of large shareholder and power balance with shareholder structure on public welfare donations is only significant in the private corporations.In private corporations,power balance with shareholder structure has a stronger inhibition on the effect of large shareholder on public welfare donations compared with state-owned corporations.

关 键 词：大股东 股权制衡 产权性质 公益性捐赠 企业捐赠 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]