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机构地区:[1]江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西南昌330032
出 处:《计算机集成制造系统》2014年第12期3125-3133,共9页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71261006);江西省社会科学规划资助项目(11GL05)~~
摘 要:在考虑服务集成商努力水平对服务质量的影响的基础上,建立了服务提供商与服务集成商之间的博弈模型,探讨了成本共担的收入共享契约下服务供应链的订购量与努力水平的协调问题,并分析了努力水平变化下订购量与努力水平同时协调的优越性,以及相关因素变化给其优越性带来的影响。结果表明,成本共担的收入共享契约能实现服务供应链订购量与努力水平的同时协调,并使服务供应链成员达到Pareto改进。从其获利程度来看,订购量与努力水平同时协调明显优于已有研究文献的订购量协调;服务成本与努力成本系数越高,订购量与努力水平同时协调的优越性就越小,而需求对服务质量的敏感系数与服务价格越高,订购量与努力水平同时协调的优越性就越大。Based on the influence of integrators' effort level on service quality, the game model between a service provider and a service integrator was established, the service supply chain coordination of effort level and order quantityunder the contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing was discussed, the coordination superiority of order quantityand effort level under the change of effort level was analyzed, and the change of relevant factors to the impact of itssuperiority was researched. The results showed that the contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing could achievethe coordination of effort level and order quantity, and make the service supply chain members to achieve Pareto im-provement. Thus the profit level was higher than the existing research literature of order quantity coordination; thehigher of service cost and effort cost coefficient, the coordination superiority of order quantity and effort level wassmaller, the higher of service price and the sensitivity of requirement to price, the coordination superiority of orderquantity and effort level was bigger.
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