大股东非执行董事与董事会治理效率——基于国有上市公司的经验证据  

Block Shareholder's Non-executive Directors and Governance Efficiency in Board of Directors: Empirical Evidence from China's State-owned Listed Companies

作　　者：王斌[1] 宋春霞[2] 孟慧祥 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第1期38-48,共11页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心项目(GZ20131002);北京市哲学社会科学基金重点项目"国有企业集团总部职能与管理控制研究"(14JGA011)

摘　　要：国有控股公司董事会建设是国有资产管理体制改革的重点之一。文章基于我国国有上市公司的大股东非执行董事这一视角,对国有上市公司董事会治理效率进行检验。研究发现:随着国有大股东所派出的大股东非执行董事在董事会中的超额席位的增高,不仅削弱了董事会的独立性和多元性,而且增强了大股东与大股东非执行董事间的利他主义倾向,提高了代理成本,最终导致董事会对经理层监督效率的降低。The construction of Board of Directors in state-owned holding companies is one of key issues in the state-owned assets management system reform. From the perspective of block shareholder＇s non-executive directors （BSNEDs） , this paper empirically tests the board governance efficiency of China＇s state-owned listed companies. The research finds that as BSNEDs nominated by the stated-owned block shareholder increase the excess seats in the Board of Directors, it not only has weakened the independence and diversification of Board of Directors but also has incurred the altruism between the block shareholder and BSNEDs as well as a higher agency cost. Eventually, it would impede the efficiency of the Board of Directors monitoring the man- agement.

关 键 词：大股东非执行董事 超额席位 董事会执行效率 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.9[经济管理—国民经济]