国有企业双重效率损失再研究  

Restudying the Dual Efficiency Losses of Chinese State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：吴延兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100836

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2015年第1期1-10,共10页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目'经济转型期技术创新的制度影响因素研究'(批准号14BJY019);人力资源和社会保障部留学人员科技活动择优资助项目'技术创新;结构优化与经济增长方式转变';中国社会科学院创新工程项目'企业创新和市场结构'

摘　　要：吴延兵基于企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权理论,提出国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。本文利用我国行业层面的国有企业和非国有企业数据,对此假说进行再次检验,研究结果仍旧支持该假说。研究还发现,国有企业在国有垄断行业中的创新效率损失远大于其在非国有垄断行业中的创新效率损失。重构国企产权和破除国企垄断应是国企改革的两大着力点。Wu Yanbing puts forward the theoretical hypothesis that the innovative efficiency loss is greater than the productive efficiency loss in Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) based on enterprises' surplus claiming right and surplus controlling right.This paper retests whether the hypothesis holds or not by using the data of Chinese SOEs and non-SOEs by industry.The research result still prudently supports the theoretical hypothesis.The research also finds that the innovative efficiency loss of SOEs in state-monopolized industries is much greater than that of the SOEs in non-state-monopolized industries.Rebuilding the property right structure of SOEs and breaking the monopoly of SOEs should be the two acting points of SOEs reform.

关 键 词：生产效率损失 创新效率损失 国有企业 国有垄断 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]