基于团队道德风险模型的担保企业集团激励约束机制研究  

Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms of Guarantee Enterprise Group Based on the Team Moral Risk Model

作　　者：李铁宁[1] 罗建华[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410004

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第1期59-67,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：湖南省哲学社会科学成果评审委员会立项课题资助项目(1011007A);湖南省教育厅资助科研项目(11C0073);湖南省普通高等学校哲学社会科学重点研究基地开放基金资助项目(11jqkf12)

摘　　要：现有团队道德风险文献更多的是针对企业内部多成员(多代理人)进行研究的,而鲜有运用团队道德风险理论模型研究集团企业内部的道德风险问题。文章将集团下属子公司看做团队中的同质性多个代理人,把担保集团的实际影响因素合理地加入已有的团队道德风险模型,以此来研究集团道德风险问题。通过对新构造的模型的数理分析,揭示出担保集团对子公司的激励约束机制,并运用实证研究验证了理论模型和结论的有效性。In order to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises（ SMEs）,a financial support model named the Credit Guarantee System is widely adopted by many countries（ Liu Zhirong,2009）. Presently,nearly 48% of all countries have established mature SME credit guarantee systems which share three characteristics. First,the government should make financing contributions and undertake certain responsibilities after determining the financing guarantee as a policy guarantee. Second,government departments should assist SMEs in organizing and managing parts of the guarantee systems and institutions. Third,there is a growing need for commercial guarantee companies of SMEs,because those companies only engage in guarantees for profitable business with low risk,such as engineering guarantee,judicial guarantee.Therefore,there are very few studies about commercial guarantee companies,including guarantee companies and groups that undertake financing policy guarantees. In contrast,China＇s national policy guarantees institutions for non-profit organizations and are based on the narrow scope of business. About 50% of guarantee funds in China＇s policy,guarantee institutions from the budget appropriation of the state and local government（ Wang Sulian,2005）. Furthermore,with the continuous expansion of the guarantee business,the demand for financial injection is bound to become stronger. However,it is impractical to consider China＇s present financial status. The guarantee industry is internationally recognized as high risky industry. Therefore,risk prevention and control are the first important task. Anew mechanism is proposed by integrating and diversifying business activities to help enterprises avoid risks（ PAN WU,2006）. The proposed mechanism is useful for enterprises to prevent and control risks.The current study primarily focuses on team moral hazard of internal members（ agents） in enterprises. Very few studies use theoretical models to address moral hazard problems existing in enter

关 键 词：担保集团 团队道德风险 激励约束机制 实证研究 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]