创业投资辛迪加网络中控制权的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Control Rights under Syndication in Venture Capital

作　　者：朱莹[1] 侯合银[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2014年第6期681-685,共5页World Sci-Tech R&D

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(09SJD630001);2012年度南京市哲学社会科学规划项目(12Y07)资助

摘　　要：创业投资的高风险性和信息不对称性使创业投资中控制权分配问题逐渐成为关系到风险投资项目成败的关键。本文运用演化博弈方法,分析控制权在辛迪加网络中两类创业投资家之间分配的博弈过程,得出在不同控制权分配比例下相应的演化稳定策略。在此结果上表明即期博弈中,创业投资家的私人收益和项目产出分配值的对比关系与控制权的分配密切相关。High risks and asymmetric information in venture finance lead the allocation of control rights in venture firms to a key of success in venture finance.In order to obtain stably evolutionary strategies under different allocation of control rights, an evolutionary game model is developed for this problem.With this model,the evolutionary dynamics between two kinds of venture capitalists in syndication network is analyzed.It is found that the allocation of control rights is related to the ratio be-tween the private benefit and project output in the current game.

关 键 词：辛迪加投资 控制权分配 私人收益 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]