基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿与监管决策研究  

Decisions of Basin Ecological Compensation and Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：高文军[1] 郭根龙[1] 石晓帅 

机构地区：[1]山西师范大学经济管理学院,山西临汾041000

出　　处：《环境科学与技术》2015年第1期183-187,共5页Environmental Science & Technology

基　　金：山西省软科学研究计划项目(2013041016-02)

摘　　要：在假定一个上游政府已经与一个下游政府签订流域生态保护协议的基础上,利用演化博弈理论分析了上游政府面向辖区内行为主体的生态补偿与监管决策问题。根据得益矩阵建立了流域生态保护策略选择的演化博弈模型,利用复制动态分析了3种情况下的演化稳定策略,并基于演化博弈分析给出了流域生态补偿与监管的政策建议。On the assumption that an upstream government has signed an agreement on basin ecological conservation with a downstream government,this paper analyzes the upstream government＇s decisions of basin ecological compensation and supervision facing behavior bodies in its own area by using evolutionary game. It sets up the evolutionary game model on the strategy choice of basin ecological conservation by the payoff matrix and analyzes the evolutionary stable strategy in three kinds of scenarios by replicator dynamics. It also proposes the suggestions on basin ecological compensation and supervision according to the game analysis.

关 键 词：演化博弈 流域生态补偿 监管 决策 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]