中职专业课教师企业实践的监督博弈分析  

Participation in Industry Affairs of Specialized Course Teachers in Secondary Vocational Schools:An Analysis of Supervision Game Theory

作　　者：刘辉[1] 李吉龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学职业技术教育学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《职业技术教育》2014年第31期61-65,共5页Vocational and Technical Education

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目<薄弱高中多样化发展的支持机制研究>(CHA130160);主持人:刘辉

摘　　要：将博弈分析方法应用于专业课教师企业实践活动研究中,可以构建一个关于中职专业课教师到企业实践的博弈均衡分析模型。在提出假设基础上,博弈分析将上级教育主管部门的监管和教师参与企业实践的行为作为分析对象,分析结果表明,提升中职专业课教师企业实践效果的策略包括着眼于优化政府监督策略,降低监督成本;提升教师积极性并提高逃避行为的成本;明确职业学校主体责任,进一步发挥纽带作用。Participation in industry affairs of specialized course teachers can bring stimulus to vocational education. By modeling the Supervision Game theory and the Nash Equilibrium,the relationship between specialized course teachers and educational agency can be shown clearly, and the results expressed that, in order to enhance the practice effects for specialized course teachers, the following strategies can be taken： optimize governmental monitoring, and decrease monitoring cost; enhance the positivity of teachers, and try to enhance the avoidance cost for teachers; clarify the subject responsibility of teachers, and to exert its linkage function.

关 键 词：监督博弈分析 中职专业课教师 企业实践 优化策略 

分 类 号：G715[文化科学—职业技术教育学]