基于双边道德风险的公路工程监理关系契约模型  

An Relational Model for High Way Construction Supervision Based on the Double Moral Hazard

作　　者：李涛[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学交通运输工程学院,湖南长沙410004 [2]浙江通衢交通建设监理咨询有限公司,浙江衢州324000

出　　处：《湘潭大学自然科学学报》2014年第4期110-116,共7页Natural Science Journal of Xiangtan University

基　　金：浙江省交通厅科技项目(2014H22)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,构建了公路工程监理关系契约模型,得出仅在正式契约条件下不能引导委托代理双方共同努力,不能使项目系统收益最大.公路工程监理关系契约能有效地促进项目业主和公路工程监理双方建立长久的合作关系,促进契约双方"自我履约性"行为的实施,有效地激励公路工程监理努力程度提高,减少契约双方的机会主义及自利行为倾向,达到控制和消除契约双方道德风险的目的.In this paper, a relational contact model for high way construction supervision is set up and it is concluded that only under the condition of a formal contact can＇t guide the both sides of the principal-agent to work together to make project system gain the biggest benefit. High way construction supervision relational contact can effectively promote both the project owners and high way construction supervision to establish long-term cooperation and it can ensure the implementation of ＂the performance of self＂ behavior between the double sides of contact. In addition, this relational contact can effectively improve the effort degree of the high way construction supervision and reduce the opportunism and self-interest behavior of the contact double sides , reach the purpose of controlling and eliminating the moral hazard between the double sides of contact.

关 键 词：双边道德风险 关系契约 公路工程监理 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]