混合所有制背景下国有股份最佳控制权研究  

The Best Control Right of State- owned Shares Under the Background of Mixed Ownership

作　　者：李振国[1] 王婷婷[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学金融学院,南京210046 [2]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2015年第1期60-66,共7页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

摘　　要：以混合所有制改革为背景,通过分析国有股份在不同控股权下,为实现控制权而与其他股东进行的博弈过程,得出股东主体形式的混合所有制与金字塔式股权结构进行结合而设计出的公司股权结构可以扩大国有股份的控制权和控制规模。建议国资委应放弃绝对控股的思维,转向相对控股;应该利用大股东间的博弈和金字塔式股权结构,以使得投资主体的所有制属性多元化从而改善产权结构、放大国有资本功能、提高国有经济效益。Under the background of the reform of mixed ownership, the paper analyzed the game between state-owned shares and other shareholders in different control rights so that state-owned shares would gain the control right. It drew the conclusion that corporate ownership structure based on the integration of mixed ownership including different shareholders with pyramidal ownership structure could expand the control right and scale of state-owned shares. It suggested that the SASAC （the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission）should give up the thinking of absolute majority shareholding, turn to relative majority shareholding, and make use of the game among major shareholders and the pyramidal ownership structure to diversify the ownership attribute of investors to improve the property right structure, amplify the function of state-owned capital and enhance the benefit of the state sector of economy.

关 键 词：混合所有制 国有股份 控制权 博弈论 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]