IT外包的质量风险防范契约设计与分析  

Design and Analysis of Quality Risk Prevention Contracts for IT Outsourcing

作　　者：张宗明[1,2] 廖貅武[2] 刘树林[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2014年第4期463-471,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目(70890081);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目(2011JM9001)

摘　　要：针对IT服务质量测度不确定性和质量成本信息不对称两种质量风险因素,运用委托代理理论研究了质量测度不确定条件下的道德风险问题,以及质量成本信息不对称条件下的逆向选择问题,刻画了相应的能够缓解质量风险的契约,并量化比较了两种质量风险因素对IT服务质量和客户企业期望效用的不利效应。研究结论为质量测度不确定和非对称质量成本信息下的契约设计提供了理论支持,为客户企业采取措施降低质量测度不确定性和质量成本信息不对称程度提供决策依据。Regarding uncertainty of quality measurement and information asymmetry of quality cost as the two major factors of quality risk in IT outsourcing,we investigate two typical problems due to these two factors：the moral hazard and the adverse selection based on principal-agent theory,respectively.We devise and analyze the optimal contracts which mitigate the adverse effect of quality risk.Furthermore,we quantify and compare the two quality risk factors＇ impact on IT service quality and the client＇s expected utility.The results provide a theoretical support for designing outsourcing contracts which take into account the two quality risk factors,and provide guidance for clients to reduce uncertainty of quality measurement as well as information asymmetry of quality cost.

关 键 词：IT外包 契约设计 质量风险 道德风险 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]