KK论题与不确定知识——对威廉姆森反KK论证的质疑  

KK Principle and Inexact Knowledge——Questionings to Williamson's Anti-KK Principle Argumentation

作　　者：雒自新[1] 刘叶涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学人文社会科学学院,西安710049 [2]燕山大学文法学院,秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2015年第3期11-16,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金第54批面上资助项目(2013M542362);河北省高校学科拔尖人才选拔与培养计划项目(BR2-253);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(RW140204);2011年度国家社科基金重大项目(11&ZD088)

摘　　要：蒂莫西·威廉姆森在《知识及其限度》一书中提出了著名的反KK论证,并应用这一论证解决意外考试悖论。该论证基于很多隐含的假设,其中主要是"容错边界"规则,该规则体现了威廉姆森的核心知识观:知识具有不确定性。本文试图在厘清这些假设的基础上反驳这一知识观,以意外考试悖论的分析为例,论证了我们的大多数知识所具有的确定性,由此证明威廉姆森的反KK论证并不成功。In Knowledge ond Its Limits Timothy Williamson argues against the KK principle. As an application to this argumentation, he proposes a solution to the surprise examination paradox. This argumentation is based on various presuppositions. The principal one is the margin for error princi- ple which embodys Williamson＇s thought of the inexact knowledge. In this paper, after clarifying these preconditions, an argumentation is advanced to show that most of our knowledge are not inexact as Williamson has said, such as the knowledge of the surprise examination paradox. So we think Williamson＇s anti-KK principle argumentation is not successful.

关 键 词：KK规则 容错边界规则 不确定知识 意外考试悖论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]