寻租腐败与中国企业出口:促进还是抑制  

Does Rent-seeking Corruption Promote or inhibit Firm Export in China

作　　者：刘锦[1] 王学军[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2015年第3期42-53,共12页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71402129)

摘　　要：转型经济体中,由于公平竞争机制的缺失,企业热衷于寻租腐败活动,其寻租能力成为企业异质性特征之一。那么,在新新贸易理论视角下,企业的寻租腐败活动是促进还是抑制了其出口呢?利用世界银行提供的中国企业调查数据,文章的实证结果表明,寻租腐败支出越多的企业,其出口越少。这一结论不因企业的所有制性质、所在地区和企业规模而改变。此外,我们还发现,腐败对企业出口活动的抑制效应在中西部省区和小规模企业中更为强烈。Firms have to seek for outsider help in the transitional economy as the absence of formal institution, so rent-seeking corruption behavior becomes one of heterogeneities of firms. Then, under the perspective of New-New Trade Theory, does corruption promote or inhibit firm export in China？ Based on the firm survey data offered by World Bank, the empirical research results of the paper show that the more the f＇Lrms make corruption payments, the less they export. This conclusion is consistent in the different subsamples. Furthermore, it finds that the inhibition effect of corruption on firm export is stronger in the smaller size firm and the center-west region.

关 键 词：寻租 腐败 出口 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]