共同代理视角下的保险经理人最优激励合约研究  

Research on Optimal Incentive Contracts of Insurance Managers: a Perspective of Common Agency

作　　者：杨馥[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安财经学院经济学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2015年第1期11-15,共5页Journal of Insurance Professional College

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目青年项目(12CJY118);陕西省教育厅项目(2013JK0151)

摘　　要：如何设计契合保险公司治理特点的经理人最优薪酬激励合约是保险业改革中的重要命题。基于共同代理理论,研究契合保险公司治理特点的经理人最优薪酬激励合约,得出了以下结论:最优激励薪酬应体现对经理人的高风险行为和短期行为的约束;监管机构在"限薪"的同时要注意防止经理人转而追逐获取控制权私人收益的行为;保单持有人无法直接对经理人提供激励合约,监管者须在公司治理层面进一步探索保单持有人利益保护的方式和途径。How to design optimal incentive contracts is an essential issue of reform on insurance industry,based on characteristics of insurers＇ corporate governance. Based on common- agency theory,the optimal incentive contracts is analyzed and the conclusions are： Optimal incentive compensation should reflect on constraints on the manager＇s high- risk and short- term behaviors; supervisors should pay attention to managers＇ private control benefits while limiting salary and policyholders cannot effectively constrain managers in insurance companies,therefore supervisors are required to further explore effective ways to protect policyholders on the level of corporate governance.

关 键 词：保险 经理人 激励合约 共同代理 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]