参股非上市金融企业:优化资本配置还是创造融资通道——基于上市公司过度投资视角的实证检验  

Participate in Holding Non-Listed Financial Enterprises:Optimize Capital Allocation or Create Financing Channel---- The Test Based on Overinvestment Perspective of the Listed Companies

作　　者：罗劲博[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第4期21-33,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71202061)

摘　　要：通过分析上市公司参股非上市金融企业的动机和目的以及参股非上市金融企业与过度投资之间的关系,发现只有参股非上市银行的公司在优化资本配置的同时,创造了更多的融资通道,其直接证据是该行为导致公司过度投资行为加剧,且该效应对于注册地位于东部及东北地区的公司更为显著。进一步的研究显示,公司的政治关联能够显著增强参股非上市银行与过度投资之间的正向关系。这一研究有助于理解产能过剩的资金供应机制,挖掘参股非上市金融机构与产能过剩之间的内在驱动机制。We analyze whether the listed participate in holding non-listed financial enterprises have influenced the corporate excess capacity（over-investment）,and study participate in holding in non-listed financial firms impact on the corporate excess capacity in the differences between different economic regions,further analyze the driving mechanism between participation in non-listed financial corporate and excess capacity,this study has shown that taking a stake in private banks can significantly increase the corporate excess capacity,but other financial institutions has no this relation;companies registered in the east and northeast regions that participate in holding non-listed financial enterprises can add the excess capacity,while those registered in the central can reduce the excess capacity;and corporate central political and political relationship power significantly strengthen the influence that participate in holding non-listed financial enterprises to the excess production capacity,the corporate representatives of the political connection do not affect this relation. The research helps to understand the financing mechanism of excess production capacity,exploring the inner drive mechanism between participate in holding non-listed financial enterprise and excess capacity.

关 键 词：参股非上市金融企业 过度投资 政治联系 驱动机制 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]