投资者保护、盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知  

Investor Protection,Earnings Management and Auditors' Risk Perception

作　　者：李明[1,2] 万洁超 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学应用经济学博士后流动站 [2]上海浦发银行博士后科研工作站,上海200002 [3]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第4期92-102,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以2007~2012年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,对投资者保护、盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,审计师不仅会关注公司的应计盈余管理行为,而且会关注公司的真实盈余管理行为,并对盈余管理产生的风险做出积极的策略反应;投资者保护水平会对盈余管理方式及审计师风险感知产生重要影响,投资者保护水平越高,审计师对真实盈余管理行为的风险感知就越敏感。Earnings management has always been a hot topic in the research of capital market,it has an important impact on stakeholders,especially on the behavior of auditors. Using data from A-share firms listed on SHSE or SZSE for the period 2007-2012,this paper investigates the relationship among investor protection,earnings management and auditors＇ risk perception. We find that,auditors care about company＇s accrual and real earnings management activities,and make a positive response on risks arising from earnings management activities. Furthermore,our research show that investor protection has an enormous impact on earning management and auditors＇ risk perception,the higher the degree of investor protection,the more auditors are sensitive to risks arising from earnings management activities.

关 键 词：投资者保护 应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 审计师风险感知 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学] F061.3[经济管理—国民经济]