论密尔的尊严观  

Analysis on J. S. Mill's Conception of Dignity

作　　者：刘睿[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北大学马克思主义学院,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《湖北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第2期108-113,149,共6页Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目:10CKS028

摘　　要：密尔借助尊严范畴完成了他对边沁的快乐论的修正,尊严观构成密尔思想体系的重要组成部分。密尔将人的尊严视为:人由自身作为高级生命存在形式而产生的高贵感;人因实现出来的高贵品性、卓越智慧或拥有某项重要权利而引发他人和自我敬重感的心理事实和价值评价。与康德的尊严观相比较,密尔的尊严观呈现出幸福主义和精英论两个基本向度。密尔的尊严观有其独特的理论意义,但也面临着一系列理论困境。全面解读密尔的尊严观,可深化对密尔思想的研究并丰富关于人的尊严问题的理论研究。By means of the category of dignity, Mill completed his modification of Bentham's theory of happiness. Conception of human dignity constitutes an important part of Mill's theory. Mill regards human dignity as human sense of nobility derived from the higher level of life existence. Psychological fact and value assessment come from human realized noble virtues, outstanding intelligence or some important rights which can cause sense of respect of others and self. Compared with Kant 's view of human dignity, Mill's view of human dignity has two basic dimensions, that is, the orientation to happiness and the tendency to elitism.Mill's view of dignity has its theoretical significance and a series of theoretical dilemmas. This paper tries to elaborate Mill 's theory about human dignity research and present a sound explanation.

关 键 词：密尔 尊严 幸福 自由 康德 

分 类 号：B561.42[哲学宗教—外国哲学]