多任务委托代理模型下发电企业经理激励研究  

Manager Incentive Mechanism of Power-generation Company based on Multi-Task Principal-agent Model

作　　者：刘鸿雁[1] 宁小欢 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济管理系,河北保定071000

出　　处：《科技和产业》2015年第3期60-64,68,共6页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJA630053)

摘　　要：为了提高企业利润,发电企业经理承担着降低发电成本和减少环境成本两个任务。针对这两个任务,通过假设发电企业的效益函数和经理的努力函数,建立了多任务委托代理模型,并运用非线性函数的求解方法进行了模型求解。通过设计发电企业经理的激励合约,得出了相对激励强度,并分析了各影响因素对相对激励强度的影响,得出了降低发电成本相对于降低环境成本难度更高、不确定性更强,因此委托人应该适当降低在这方面的激励比例的结论。In order to increase profits,the manager of power-generation company has two tasks to finish which are the reductions of the generation cost and the environment cost.In view of the two tasks,a multi-task principal-agent model is set up by assuming the profit function of the powergeneration company and the endeavor function of the manager in this paper,and solved by using the solution method of the nonlinear function.The incentive contract to encourage the manager to low costs is designed,and the relative incentive coefficient is calculated.The paper analyzes the factors that affecting the relative incentive coefficient,conclusions is arrived that compared with reducing the environment cost,the task of lowing the generation cost is more difficult and more indeterminate for the manager to finish,so the company should reduce the incentive ratio of the generation cost to increase the principal＇s benefits.

关 键 词：多任务委托代理模型 激励 发电企业 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]