可错论的合理证明与碰巧为真的运气——葛梯尔问题的实质及相关错误理解  

Fallibilist Justification and Veritic Epistemic Luck:The Essence of Gettier Problem and Misunderstandings in It

作　　者：文学平[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学马克思主义学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2015年第2期108-119,共12页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：2013年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC720040);2012年重庆市教委人文社会科学项目(12SKC122);2013年重庆市教委择优资助计划资助项目(ZYZUSZK2013003);国家留学基金资助项目

摘　　要：葛梯尔问题是如何解决知识论上存在的悖论的问题,并非仅仅是寻找第四条件的问题;葛梯尔问题的实质在于可错论的合理证明与运气的结合,而非仅仅是推理的前提有误,更非语词的误用。可错论的合理证明始终会为信念之碰巧为真保留一定的可能性,运气使这种可能性成为现实;可错论的合理证明原则不可废,否则,怀疑论将不可避免,因此,消除运气的影响就成了解决葛梯尔问题的关键。More than half a century ago, the American philosopher Edmund Gettier proposed two classic counterexamples against the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge. These counterexamples have brought a great problem for the definition of knowledge, which is called “the Gettier problem.” There has been endless debate among epistemologists about how to understand and solve it and a lot of misunderstandings of that problem have thus arisen. Firstly, the Gettier problem has been narrowly interpreted by some epistemologists as the problem of searching for a fourth condition that has to add to the justified true-belief definition of propositional knowledge. In fact, the the Gettier problem aims to solve the paradox in epistemology which can be shown in the following three propositions： （1） Knowledge is justified true belief; （2） S has a justified true belief p; （3） S does not know that p. These three propositions can not be true at the same time because they are inconsistent. To solve this paradox, you can partly or completely deny any one or two of those three propositions. Searching for the fourth condition is but one of the many proposed approaches to the Gettier problem. Secondly, some epistemologists think that the Gettier problem results from the false premise of deduction, which directly leads to the no-false premise solution （NFPS） to the problem. NFPS can either be strict or moderate. As a strong advocate of strict NFPS, the Chinese epistemologist Chen Jiaming interprets epistemic justification as “verification,” and then views Gettier＇s counterexample of the ten-coin case not as an epistemic case but as the case of misusage of words. In fact, the strict NFPS is a disguised form of infallibilism which directly results in skepticism while the proponents of the moderate NFPS fail to make clear the meaning of “essentially” in the condition that “S＇s justification for p does not essentially depend on any false premise.” The failure of NFPS arises from the misconception abo

关 键 词：可错论 合理证明 运气 葛梯尔问题 敏感性 安全性 知识论 

分 类 号：B81-0[哲学宗教—逻辑学]