上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与高管薪酬的关联研究  

The Association Study of Disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies and Executive Compensation Contracts

作　　者：杨程程[1] 程小可[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学会计系,北京100044

出　　处：《东北师大学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第2期77-80,共4页Journal of Northeast Normal University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272055)

摘　　要：以《企业内部控制配套指引》在沪深主板上市公司实施为背景,基于薪酬契约理论,选用2012年内部控制信息数据为研究样本,描述上市公司内部控制缺陷披露行业特征,通过构建OLS回归模型,探究上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与高管薪酬之间的关联关系。研究发现:我国上市公司内部控制缺陷披露与其高管薪酬水平存在一种倒置现象,即相对于未披露其内部控制缺陷的上市公司,那些披露其内部控制缺陷的公司具有更高的高管薪酬水平;同时,我国上市公司内部控制缺陷披露显著提高了上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性。Based on the background of the implementation of ＂Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control＂and the Compensation Contracts theory,describing the industry characteristics of listed companies to disclose internal control deficiencies,building on OLS regression model,using the 2012 internal control data,we explore the relationship between behaviors of the disclosure of internal control deficiencies and the executive compensation levels on Chinese listed firms.We find that there is an inversion phenomenon between internal control deficiencies of listed companies and their executive pay levels,the firms which disclosed their internal control deficiencies have a higher level of executive compensation,and the disclosure of internal control deficiencies increases the pay for performance sensitivity of the Chinese listed firms.

关 键 词：上市公司 内部控制 内部控制缺陷 薪酬—业绩敏感性 《企业内部控制配套指引》 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]