双重成本控制标准下企业收益分配信号博弈  

Game for enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard

作　　者：孟凡生[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《控制与决策》2015年第4期764-768,共5页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072075);教育部博士点基金项目(20092304110017);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G201135)

摘　　要：按照双重成本控制标准对企业员工进行分类,将企业和员工作为参与收益分配博弈的局中人,认定他们在收益分配策略选择中均为理性人,能够选择使自己利益最大化的策略.根据企业在收益分配中具有的信息优势,构建双重成本控制标准下的企业收益分配信号博弈模型,提出博弈可能出现的4种均衡结果和条件,指出只有在员工确定其收益恰好等于预期,且企业提供高支付方案时才会出现最有效率的分离均衡,其他3种结果都不是最有效率的均衡.According to the dual cost control standard, the employees are classified, the enterprise and employees are treated as the players participating income distribution game, which are considered to be all rational people in the choice of income distribution strategies and can choose the strategies to make their own benefits maximization. On this basis of information advantages of the enterprise in the income distribution, the game model of enterprise income distribution signal under dual cost control standard is established, the possible four kinds of equilibrium results and conditions are proposed. It is pointed out that when employees ensure income is just equal to expectation and enterprise provides high payment scheme, the most efficiency separating equilibrium will appear, while other three results are not the most efficiency equilibrium.

关 键 词：成本控制标准 信号博弈 收益分配 均衡 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]