新型农村社会养老保险激励机制分析  

The Research on Incentive Mechanism of New Rural Social Pension Insurance

作　　者：陈云凡[1] 谭璇[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2015年第2期108-117,共10页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"高风险家庭儿童防虐体系研究"(12CSH095)

摘　　要：基于局部均衡分析框架,通过精算方法对新型农村居民基本养老保险四种模式的激励效应和再分配效应研究。结果表明:现行制度对中青年人参保和居民选择缴费档次激励效应偏低;制度具有一定的代际再分配效应,但是在代内之间不仅不具有再分配效应,而且有些模式还会产生逆向收入转移。在现有制度设计中,希望通过财政方式同时达到激励与再分配效应是难以兼顾的,而且还会影响制度保障水平提升。因此,新型农村社会养老保险应进行优化,而优化关键是理清财政补贴与个人账户之间的功能。财政补贴应侧重再分配效应,向缴费年龄高和低收入居民倾斜。个人账户应主要侧重激励效应,通过较高回报率激励居民参保,提高保障水平。Based on the partial equilibrium analysis fram ew ork, the incentive and redistributive effects of the four pension insurance m odes for new rural residents w ere calculated in actuarial m ethod. T he results show that the existing system has low incentive effects on the w illingness of people of m iddle and young ages to buy insurance and their choices of pay level of insurance, although this system ow ns intergenerational redistribution effects to a certain extent, there are not only no redistribution effects on the intra-redistribution,but also som e of them even bring reverse transfer of incom e. It’s unrealistic to balance incentive and redistribution effects by m eans of finance in the existing system;on the contrary,it w ill affect the prom otion of the security level. T herefore the new rural social pension insurance should be optim ized,and the key is to clarify the functions betw een the financial subsidies and individual accounts. Financial subsi-dies should focus on redistribution effect and be inclined to pay high age and low incom e residents,w hile individual ac-counts should m ainly focus on the incentive effect, m otivate residents insured by a higher rate of return, and enhance the level of protection.

关 键 词：新型农村居民养老保险 激励机制 再分配 

分 类 号：F842.67[经济管理—保险] D669.6[政治法律—政治学]