机构投资者持股、高管权力与现金分红研究  

A Study on Institutional Holding,Managerial Power and Cash Dividends

作　　者：齐鲁光[1,2] 韩传模[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学 [2]山东理工大学

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2015年第4期52-57,共6页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"经济周期;融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择"(项目号:71302114)

摘　　要：上市公司不分红或少分红一直是我国资本市场治理的热点和难点问题。笔者将管理权力理论纳入现金分红治理研究框架,利用A股上市公司2009—2013年数据为样本对高管权力集中与上市公司现金分红之间的关系进行实证检验,并探究机构投资者在其中的治理作用。研究发现,高管权力集中公司现金分红的可能性小、支付的现金红利较少;进一步研究发现,机构投资者可以促进高管权力集中上市公司的现金分红,抑制高管权力集中产生的代理问题。该研究拓展了我国资本市场现金分红治理的研究视角,丰富了股利理论的研究文献。引导机构投资者积极发挥外部治理作用、逐步完善高管权力制衡机制以及将现金分红水平纳入高管绩效评价体系或写进高管薪酬契约将有助于解决上市公司的不分红或少分红难题。In recent years, zero-dividend or low dividend payout ratio of listed company in China stock market has been gaining increasing attention in academia. Integrating the theory of Management Power into the research framework of cash dividend governance, this paper empirically investigates the re- lationship between the managerial power concentration and cash dividend of listed companies, employing the sample of A-share listed companies in China. Furthermore, the role played by institutional investors in corporate governance is also discussed. It finds that, those companies who have higher managerial power concentration will normally have smaller probability of cash dividend and lower cash dividend payout. Further study in this paper shows that institutional investor can be a motivation to increase cash dividends in listed companies with intensive managerial power concentration and hence relieve agency problem there- of. This study extends the research horizon of the cash dividend governance in capital market of China, and enriches the research literature of dividend theory. According to this paper, both directing institution- al investors to play an active role in the external governance, improving the restraint mechanism of manag- erial power, and taking the cash dividend payout ratio into executive performance evaluation system or in- tegrating it into executive compensation contracts will be critically helpful to solve the puzzle of zero-divi- dend or low cash dividend payout ratio of listed company in China.

关 键 词：管理权力理论 现金分红 高管权力 机构投资者持股 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]