政府干预下的资产注入、金字塔股权结构与公司绩效——来自我国地方国有控股上市公司资产注入的经验证据  

Asset Injection under the Government Intervention,Pyramid Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance——From the Empirical Evidence of Local State-holding Listed Companies' Asset Injection Activities

作　　者：章卫东[1] 张江凯[1] 成志策[1] 徐翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心/会计学院,330013

出　　处：《会计研究》2015年第3期42-49,94,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"地方国有上市公司定向增发资产注入动机及经济后果研究"(71262004)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：转轨经济背景下,我国国有企业的各项经济活动及后果既深受政府干预的影响,又与其内部的股权和治理机制密切相关。本文从理论和实证两个方面研究了政府干预对地方国有控股上市公司资产注入后公司绩效的影响,并研究了金字塔股权结构对政府干预地方国有控股上市公司资产注入的防御作用。研究发现,地方国有控股上市公司所在地的政府干预程度越高,资产注入后的公司绩效越差;金字塔股权结构则可以抑制政府对地方国有控股上市公司资产注入的干预,并且当地方国有控股上市公司金字塔层级和链条数越多时,抑制政府干预的作用越强。本文的研究结论对于优化国有企业内部股权结构和治理机制、建立更加合理的政企关系等具有一定的借鉴意义。Economic activities and consequences of China's state- owned enterprises are deeply affected by the government intervention and inside corporate mechanisms.We discuss the corporate performance in the asset injection of local state- holding listed companies under the government intervention and study the pyramid ownership structure's function of restraining the government intervention.We find that the higher the government intervention extent of local state- holding listed companies,the worse the companies' performances are.And when layers and chains nf pyramid ownership structures are more,the function of restraining the government inten'ention is stronger.Our conclusions are significant for improving state-owned enterprises' ownership structures and rebuilding a more reasonable relationship between the government and enterprises.

关 键 词：政府干预 资产注入 金字塔股权结构 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F275