制造企业产品质量问题的信号博弈模型  

Game Model of Product Quality Problem in Manufacturing Corporations

作　　者：李磊[1] 谢淑娟[2] 蔡靖[1] 倪明放[3] 

机构地区：[1]南昌工学院信息学院,江西南昌330108 [2]南昌工学院经济管理学院,江西南昌330108 [3]解放军理工大学通信工程学院,江苏南京210007

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2015年第7期31-35,共5页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：基于制造企业产品质量信息不对称的特点,以制造企业和客户作为博弈方,以客户服务水平作为产品质量信号,建立信号博弈模型,分析信号博弈的三种贝叶斯均衡及其条件,得出了信息不对称情况下制造企业和客户的应对策略.Based on the characteristic of product quality information asymmetry in manufacturing corporations, with the manufacturing corporation and the customer as the game side, and with customer service as a product quality signal, the signal game model is established. Three kind of Bayesian equilibrium of signal game and the condition are analyzed. In addition, the strategies of the manufacturing corporation and the customer under the information asymmetry are put forward.

关 键 词：信号博弈 信息不对称 完美贝叶斯均衡 制造企业 产品质量 客户服务 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]