意图的形而上学  

Metaphysics of Intention

作　　者：张巍[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学马克思主义学院,天津300072

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2015年第2期19-24,共6页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划课题"集体意图哲学理论及其在社会建设与文化建设中的应用研究"(项目编号:TJZX13-003)

摘　　要："意图的形而上学"作为行动哲学中的核心论题之一,一直以来都是学界关注的重点。在最初的论述中,研究者习惯把意图理解成为一种非本体论意义上的意向状态,即把意图还原成信念或愿望,或者它们的叠加。但是随着行动哲学与心灵哲学研究的不断发展,尤其是对"意向性"论题研究的不断深入,学界逐渐改变了原有的关于意图的立场,认为意图是一种不能被还原的、并且有其独特性的意向状态,而这种独特性对于行动的说明发挥着基础作用。近年来,学界虽然出现了对早期意图理论的新辩护,但这些辩护没能充分体现出意图在行动说明中所发挥的独特作用,因此并不构成对意图的独特性的反驳。The metaphysics of intention is one of the main topics of philosophy of action. In early discussions, researchers tended to interpret intention as a non-ontological intentional state that can be reduced into belief, desire, or the superposition of the two. But with the development of the research of philosophy of action and philosophy of mind, especially the research on intentionality, intention is thought in the academic circle to be a non-reductive and unique intentional state. This uniqueness plays a very important and basic role in the explanation of action. In recent years, some scholars try to justify the early reductive theory in a new way, but these justifications cannot provide any valid arguments against the uniqueness of intention, as they miss the effectiveness of intention in the explanation of action.

关 键 词：意图 意向性 意向状态 行动说明 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]