基于议价模型的售后服务供应链合作研究  

Research on after-sale service supply chain based on bargaining model

作　　者：蔡路路[1] 华国伟[1] 张菊亮[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]清华大学现代管理研究中心,北京100084

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2015年第2期225-230,共6页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71390334;71132008;71071015);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-13-0660);教育部人文社科基地重大资助项目(11JJD630004)

摘　　要：研究耐用产品的售后服务供应链协调问题.考虑一个由单个供应商和单个顾客组成的二级售后服务供应链,顾客与供应商达成购买耐用产品的交易意向后,双方谈判决定产品的售后服务契约条款,以保障产品今后的正常运行.售后服务契约由固定费用、成本分担率和缺货惩罚率构成.顾客获得的售后服务水平由供应商对其配置的售后备件库存量决定,而供货商可以从顾客处获得服务费用作为收益.首先通过分析集权和分权模型的最优决策,证明分权供应链未能协调,并且它的服务水平低于集权供应链的水平.最后,利用合作Nash议价理论设计使供应链达到合作的契约,进一步分析各参数和供应链成员的风险态度对契约选择的影响.This paper studies an after-sale supply chain between a durable product supplier and a customer. The customer purchases a set of durable product from the supplier, then negotiate an after-sale contract to ensure the uptime of the product. The contract includes a fixed payment, a cost-sharing incentive and a performance incentive. The service level depends on how many after-sale resources the supplier offers, and how much the customer pays for the service. First, both the centralized and decentralized system are analyzed. It is shown that the service level in a decentralized system is lower than that in a centralized system, and it cannot be coordinated. Then, a Nash bargaining contract to coordinate a decentralized supply chain is designed. The impacts of the parameters and the risk attitude on the contract are discussed.

关 键 词：售后服务 议价模型 备件库存 供应链协调 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]