管理防御视角下经理人长短期项目选择的可分离均衡  

The separable equilibrium analysis about managers' selection of long or short investment project in the perspective of managerial entrenchment

作　　者：李秉祥[1] 吴建祥[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]西安财经学院统计学院,西安710100

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第4期939-944,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71272118;70872092);陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902);西安统计研究院项目(09JD07)

摘　　要：李秉祥和薛思珊运用信号博弈模型分析了具有经理管理防御行为的经理人都偏好实施短期项目,本文在此基础上证明如果给予经理人适当的补贴,则可出现经理人长短期项目选择的部分可分离均衡,即有能力择业成本低的经理人选择长期项目,有能力择业成本高或无能力类型的经理人员选择短期项目,股东根据项目的收益决定是否继续聘任现任经理.该补贴机制能有效减少因管理防御引致投资短视行为,提高企业的投资效率,对股东和经理人实现双赢,对治理因管理防御而导致的投资短视行为有一定的理论指导意义.Li Bing-xiang and Xue Si-shan analysed that the managers who are entrenched prefer short- term project by using signal game model. On the basis, the paper present that there is a separable equilibrium in the managers if given appropriate subsidies to the managers, the capable manager with low employment cost will choose long-term project, the capable manager with hight employment cost or incapable manager will choose short-term project, the shareholders decide whether to employ the current manager according to the benefit of project. The scheme can effectively reduce the investment myopia behavior caused by managerial entrenchment and improve the efficiency of enterprises＇ investment. The conclusion has directive meaning to restrain investment myopia behavior in the enterprises.

关 键 词：管理防御 投资短视行为 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]