合乎“权利”的司法观及其批判  

The Justice Concept in Line with ＂Rights＂ and Our Critique

作　　者：邹立君[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学法学院

出　　处：《南京大学法律评论》2015年第1期121-134,共14页Nanjing University Law Review

基　　金：作者主持的国家社会科学基金项目“司法政策与裁判正义实证研究”(项目编号为:11CFX054)的阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：我们在认识典型案例蕴含着的＂合适的判决＂所依据的司法标准问题时,往往囿于既有的认知类型和观念。若从司法实践与理论上的可能性和多样性来看,司法观念的类型化和固化现象都应当引起我们的注意,否则,我们难以真正应对现实的司法困境。辨析合乎＂权利＂的司法观及其可能存在的问题,既是在检省当下英美占据主导地位的司法实践的意义和价值等问题,也是在为中国司法实践与观念的某种转换性创造提供可能的思想条件。We are often confined to the existing cognitive types and concepts, when we want to understand the criterion of justice contained by the ＂right judgment＂ of a typical case. If we take the possibilities and diversities of the judicial practice and theory into account, we should be aware of the typing and the solidification of justice concept, otherwise, we can not really deal with the actual judicial dilemmas. Identifying the justice concept in line with ＂right＂ and its possible problems, we cart not only review the meanings and values of the dominant Anglo-American judicial practice, but also provide possible ideological conditions to create some type of transformative Chinese justice concept.

关 键 词：司法认识 司法类型 司法观念 

分 类 号：D926[政治法律—法学]