混同均衡下信号博弈模型在食品供应链质量安全研究中的应用  

Study the Application of Signal Game Model under Pooling Equilibrium on the Quality and Safety of Food Supply Chain

作　　者：付海民[1] 杨阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院,北京101149

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2015年第3期75-76,共2页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：文中将混同完美贝叶斯均衡条件下的信号博弈模型应用于食品供应链质量安全激励机制的研究,把政府的激励政策作为参数引入到信号博弈模型中去,得出在混同完美贝叶斯均衡条件下政府激励政策在食品供应链质量安全水平提高过程中的作用。This paper will study the application of signal game model under pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium conditions on the quality and safety of food supply chain incentive mechanism.The government incentive policies as a parameter is introduced to the signal game model,and draws the conclusion that in the government incentive policy pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium conditions in the process of increasing role in food quality and safety in the food supply chain.

关 键 词：信号博弈 混同完美贝叶斯均衡 食品供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]